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Abstract 
The problem of subjectivity within psychological research has long been recognized. The 
practices of scientific psychology, however, continue to assume that objectivity is desirable, 
even if not completely possible, and that subjectivity is a source of bias that must be 
minimized or eliminated. Such a dispassionate stance has offered and continues to offer a 
range of benefits, not least a tight focus on SDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHOHYDQWUHVSRQVHV1RQHWKHOHVVLQ
this article, we question the wisdom of always or automatically working to minimize 
participant and researcher subjectivity, and we invite psychological researchers to consider 
the benefits of a more, what we term, reflexive scientific attitude. We turn in particular to 
recent theoretical and methodological innovations within qualitative research in order to help 
us progress toward a more reflexive psychological science where subjectivity is re-viewed as 
a resource that can be tapped in order to contextualize and enrich the psychological research 
process and its products. 
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In this article we invite psychological researchers to reconsider the established orientation 
toward objectivity in favor of a reflexive scientific attitude that encompasses recognizing and 
working positively with subjectivity in the research process. Our conception of subjectivity is 
psychosocial, such that individual meaning making is situated within a range of social 
(interpersonal, group, societal) contexts²a position we elaborate upon below. We are 
not suggesting that psychological research overlooks subjective data; indeed, we 
acknowledge various paradigms where participant accounts are explicitly sought, captured, 
and analyzed. However, we suggest that a more sustained critical engagement with 
participant and researcher subjectivity (and their interrelationship, or intersubjectivity) can 
offer benefits in terms of the research experience and production of knowledge (see Finlay & 
Gough, 2003). Following contributions from social theorists and qualitative researchers 
influenced by social constructionism (Burr, 1995), we provide examples of methodological 
strategies designed to incorporate and exploit subjectivities, discuss some of the complex 
issues involved in doing so, and reflect on the limits of such research practices. But first we 
(briefly) summarize some important questions concerning the scientific embrace of 
objectivity.  
Concerns about scientific methods in psychology are not new. Throughout the history 
of the discipline seminal figures have expressed doubts about the ideal of objectivity, 
including William James (1890) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1996). In more recent times, various 
critics have challenged the assumptions and methods of scientific psychology, ranging from 
social psychologists concerned about the ecological validity of experiments (see Armistead, 
1974), to feminist (cf. Harding, 1992; Reinharz, 1992), queer (Butler, 1990; Sedgewick, 
1999), and critical race scholars (Gates, 1997; L. Parker, Deyhle, & Villenas, 1999)²among 
others² who argued that psychology had normalized the behavior of particular groups (e.g., 
White middle-class heterosexual men) under the auspices of objective science.  
The effects of experimenter choices and preferences have of course been examined by 
social psychologists, giving birth to such terms as experimenter effects (Rosenthal, 1976) and 
demand characteristics (Orne, 1962). In the 1980s sociologists of scientific knowledge 
(Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Woolgar, 1988) highlighted how scientists invoked a contingent 
repertoire, that is, references to error, subjectivity, and environmental constraints when 
experiments appear to fail, or when competing research groups obtain different results. Such 
work draws attention to the centrality of human (inter)subjectivity, particularly 
unacknowledged investments, in conducting and explaining the outcomes of scientific 
investigations. Nonetheless, experimenter subjectivity continues to be neglected in 
psychological science (see Fox-Keller, 1996), while objectivity is endorsed in textbooks (e.g., 
Davey, 2004), buttressed by various techniques designed to tackle the influence of 
subjectivity, such as double-blind procedures, standardized instructions, and random 
allocation of participants to experimental conditions, which are central to the discipline. 
Similarly, the subjectivity of the research participant is often overlooked²even when 
participants are invited to generate subjective reports (e.g., descriptions of significant events 
or memories), the administration of experimenter-designed assorted rating scales (e.g., 
pleasantness of event) and tests (e.g., later memory recall) dominates proceedings. In 
questionnaire studies, the respondent is limited to tick-box responses or numbers on a scale, 
often with no opportunity to qualify or elaborate on their responses. And, as with 
experiments, the researcher who has formulated or reproduced the questionnaire(s) remains a 
remote stranger.  
[p. 275] The inclination toward objectivity in psychology can also be gleaned from 
critiques of qualitative research as overly subjective (e.g., Archer, 2004). Notwithstanding the 
greater presence of qualitative methods within psychological research in recent years (see 
Madill & Gough, 2008), the lesser status it is afforded within the discipline generally, 
indexed by the predominance of experimental methods within prestigious publications and 
funded research projects (Rennie, Watson, & Monteiro, 2002), underscores the scientific 
discomfort in relation to the issue of subjectivity.  
This discomfort with subjectivity clearly makes sense from a psychological science 
standpoint that emphasizes theoretically driven research and replicability of research 
procedures and design, and we are not suggesting that researchers utilizing quantitative 
methods undo or undermine commitment to established research paradigms. What we are 
proposing is a broader, more inclusive conception of psychological research in which there is 
room for qualitative and quantitative data, meaning and measurement, and understanding as 
well as control. In this flexible, pragmatic approach, different aspects of investigation would 
be variously explicated for different constituencies (e.g., user groups vs. science journals), for 
different purposes (e.g., practical application of findings vs. contribution to theory; see e.g., 
Yardley, 2007; Yardley & Bishop, 2007). And as we have argued in a previous article 
(Madill & Gough, 2008), it would be a mistake to apply simple distinctions between 
qualitative and quantitative research, as this would overlook commonalities across different 
methodologies and the very real differences between specific qualitative (and quantitative) 
methods.  
Acknowledging methodological plurality, we invite psychological researchers to 
consider the benefits of a more reflexive scientific attitude. Such an attitude would involve an 
active engagement with subjectivities in the research process, deploying strategies to 
incorporate (rather than avoid) the personal into the design and conduct of research, thereby 
producing knowledge that is both rich and valid. Of course, definitions and measures of 
richness and validity will vary according to methodological and theoretical investment; here, 
we suggest that utilization and/or exploitation of qualitative, reflexive techniques can add 
depth to findings and help situate the research within relevant social contexts.  
There is historical precedent for engagement with subjectivity within quantitative and 
mixed methods research, even by psychologists working within experimental methodology. 
For example, Morawski (2005) highlighted three instances of reflexive endeavour in the first 
KDOIRIWKHWKFHQWXU\ZKHUHE\WKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶V own cognitions were scrutinized 
(William James), his (or her) social status and its effects critically examined (Horace Mann 
Bond), and unconscious processes within the experimental situation identified (Saul 
Rosenzweig). With these points in mind, in this article we consider some of the concepts 
(e.g., reflexivity) and strategies (e.g., participant validation) that qualitative researchers have 
fruitfully deployed so that we can begin to formulate a more reflexive psychological science 
where subjectivity is re-viewed as a resource that can be tapped in order to contextualize and 
enrich the research process and its products. Before considering how the subjectivity of 
research participants and researchers themselves can be mobilized, we first (briefly) consider 
different conceptions of subjectivity and their implications for designing and conducting 
psychological research. 
Conceptions of Subjectivity 
In this section we first outline the dominant models of subjectivity that have and continue to 
influence psychological science and advocate a psychosocial conception for psychologists. 
The subject who participates in research studies has been defined in many different ways 
throughout the history of psychology. Biological notions of instinct-driven creatures gave 
way to the stimulus±response machine proposed by behaviorists in the early 20th century 
before the cognitive metaphor of the information processor rose to prominence, albeit now 
inflected by contemporary neuroscience (see e.g., Kandel & Squire, 2000). Psychologists are 
aware that people are more complex than theories and experimental techniques often allow, 
as demonstrated by research on participant reactivity and, indeed, on experimenter effects 
(see Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). What we are advocating in this article is that the 
complexities of human subjectivity may be incorporated even more fruitfully into 
psychological science.  
A romantic, experiential subject is often counter-posed to the unitary rational subject 
sometimes implied by psychological research (Sampson, 1991). For example, a romantic 
subject was presented in Rogerian client-centered therapy and in the language of self-
actualization in the mid-20th century (Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1951), while Continental 
thinkers adopted a more existential take on subjectivity, focusing on issues of individual 
choice, responsibility, and mortality (e.g., Heidegger, 1962; Sartre, 1956). A respect for 
personal choice and meaning has been embraced in particular by phenomenological 
researchers interested in exploring individual experience through written and verbal reports 
(Giorgi, 2009; J. Smith, 2004). One of the most notable examples is work on flow experience 
by Csikszentmihalyi (1988) whereby accounts of peak or optimal experiences are collected 
and analyzed in depth. These can vary widely, ranging from artistic, sporting, and educational 
endeavors through to work, leisure, and spiritual activities in which the individual is 
completely absorbed in the situation and is performing at a high level.  
Phenomenological and some narrative work (see Bruner, 1987; Polkinghorne, 1988) 
in this vein operates an interpretative stance known as a hermeneutics of faith (Ricoeur, 
1970), that is, treating the human subject as an expert on their experience and able to provide 
a transparent window onto their world through interview based accounts (see Josselson, 
2004). In most cases, the interview is privileged as the research format where participants can 
be made to feel sufficiently comfortable and respected in order to offer up meanings that are 
personally salient (see Kvale, 1996). However, experiential±phenomenological theory and 
research has been critiqued for downplaying the social contexts in which individuals are 
situated and that shape and constrain their responses (see I. Parker, 2005). Other approaches, 
influenced by social constructionism and the linguistic turn in social theory, view the subject 
and their accounts as located in social, political, and cultural contexts.  
There are many different social perspectives on subjectivity, and a concomitant array 
of theoretical terms, such as relational, situated, and distributed (Gergen, 2009; Stevens, 
1996; Wetherell & Maybin, 1996). In these perspectives, the individual is inextricably linked 
to other people and tied to sets of social, cultural, and political contexts that influence and 
often constrain human action. The individual and the social are thus interconnected, with 
different theorists specifying different levels of human agency. For [p.376] example, those 
influenced by the philosopher Michel Foucault focus on the oppressive operations of 
dominant ideologies, or discourses, whereby individuals are classified, diagnosed, and 
institutionalized in various ways (e.g., relating to prevailing norms about madness, sexuality, 
and crime; see I. Parker, 2002). Others, such as discursive psychologists (Potter, 2007), 
suggest that the individual can be proactive, creative, and flexible in positioning the self in 
favorable ways when interacting with others and notwithstanding wider social constraints. 
Still others maintain that individual choices and actions are influenced and limited by early 
childhood experiences and associated desires, disappointments, and defenses (see Hollway & 
Jefferson, 2000). Indeed there is much debate in U.K. social psychology and psychosocial 
studies on the nature and interpretation of subjectivity (see Hollway & Jefferson, 2005, plus 
commentaries; Walkerdine, 2008).  
,Q5LFRHXU¶VWHUPVWKHRU\-driven interpretations of personal accounts, whether 
emanating from psychoanalytic, discursive, or other traditions, operate under a hermeneutics 
of suspicion. In this approach, participant narratives are not taken at face value since 
individuals are considered to be subjected to forces (e.g., unconscious desires, ideological 
regimes) beyond their awareness or which they simply take for granted (see Johnson, 1999). 
It is therefore the job of the researcher to decipher or decode those meanings that are hidden 
to the individual by invoking theoretical constructs and persuading others of the plausibility 
of the analytic interpretation. When done well, theoretically informed interpretations can 
enrich our understanding of phenomena and are appropriately ³RZQHG´E\WKHUHVHDUFKHUZKR
takes responsibility for arguing the rationale for, and benefits of, applying a particular 
theoretical lens. On the other hand, such research risks estranging 
research participants in a process that might be experienced as scholarly colonization (see 
Josselson, 1996).  
So, defining subjectivity is a difficult task amidst ongoing discussions and 
disagreements. At the very least, we can say that the dominant contemporary view (albeit 
outside mainstream psychology) is that subjectivity is complex, fluid, and constructed in 
relation to prevailing personal, interpersonal, and social contexts. With these features in 
mind, we now turn to the main purpose of the article²promoting methods of working 
positively with human subjectivity within psychological research. 
How to Accommodate Participant Subjectivity Within Psychological Research 
What should be done with participant subjectivity in practice? One approach is to do nothing, 
that is, to simply conduct research as intended without encouraging participants to comment 
further on their research experience or the phenomenon under investigation. Many qualitative 
researchers, however, prefer to promote greater participant involvement in their research (see 
Finlay & Gough, 2003, for examples). The precise form of participant involvement will 
GHSHQGRQRQH¶VWKHRUHWLFDOVWDQFHLQFOXGLQJ assumptions about the psychological subject.  
 We recognize that subjectivity is factored into much mainstream research in 
psychology. Many psychological studies use a range of self-report and personality measures 
designed to discriminate between individuals and to predict the influence of self-variable x 
(e.g., extroversion, locus of control, self-efficacy) on outcome variable y (e.g., alcohol 
consumption, aggression, quality of life). In cognitive psychology, for example, thinking 
aloud protocols are elicited from participants in order to elucidate thought processes and 
strategies and, although the topic and task are preordained by the researcher, the individual is 
encouraged to speak freely about their salient cognitions (Ericsson & Simon, 1980). In social 
psychology, we also acknowledge that many research projects incorporate a subjective 
dimension, including classic studies such as the Stanford prison experiment (SPE; Haney, 
Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). Here, as well as completing various rating scales and being 
observed, guards and prisoners were interviewed during and after the study, and prisoner± 
guard interactions in the yard were recorded. Moreover, some interview extracts (termed 
representative personal statements) are offered in the published article and introduced thus:  
Much of the flavor and impact of this prison experience is unavoidably lost in the 
relatively formal, objective analyses outlined in this article. The following quotations 
taken from interviews, conversations and questionnaires provide a more personal 
view of what it was like to be a prisoner or guard. (Haney et al., 1973, p. 87)  
This is surely an enthusiastic rationale for deploying qualitative methods as a 
complement to quantitative research so that insights into important experiences can be 
gleaned. We recognize and commend such research where individual accounts, especially 
pertaining to subjectively important experiences as defined by research participants, are 
elicited. But we do think that in such cases the often rich data collected could be exploited 
and examined further. For example, in the SPE article (Haney et al., 1973), selected 
qualitative data extracts are presented without any researcher commentary drawing attention 
to key constructs, as if the data speak for themselves.  
The benefits of a more sustained orientation to subjectivity in quantitative psychology 
research can be illustrated with reference to the rich body of work on autobiographical 
memory. In many studies in [p.377] this area, research participants are asked to generate 
accounts of previous or current experiences (see Bohn & Berntsen, 2007). The instructions 
may vary on the nature of accounts to be produced, ranging from relatively open-ended 
invitations to those where certain canonical dimensions must be covered (e.g., location, 
activity, time), and often participants are asked to complete rating scales on relevant variables 
(e.g., vividness of memory, confidence, intensity). Typically, following a predetermined time 
interval, participants will be asked to generate a second account of the experience(s) in 
question, again accompanied by particular instructions and rating scales. The accuracy of the 
second account is then usually checked against the first account (presumed to be the master 
record), with specific errors highlighted. The (in)accuracy of later accounts can be scored and 
interrater reliability calculated. The predictive utility of nominated independent variables 
(e.g., vividness) for accuracy may then be determined.  
Such studies rely heavily on the subjective accounts of participants, who are often 
encouraged to choose personally salient events and asked to describe these in detail. Research 
reports will IUHTXHQWO\SUHVHQWH[WUDFWVIURPSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DFFRXQWVIRUH[DPSOH contrasting 
the original with the second account to highlight the nature and number of errors. As 
mentioned, the level of (in)accuracy is measured using a scheme devised by the researchers, 
so qualitative and quantitative data are regarded as complementary, mutually reinforcing. 
There are examples of studies this area, however, where participant involvement is more 
pronounced and where outcomes are significant and fascinating. For our illustration here we 
focus on a quite famous experiment by Neisser and Harsch (1992) on phantom flashbulb 
memories. Briefly, the study revolved around the 1986 Challenger Space Shuttle disaster, 
with 106 students given a questionnaire enquiring: ³+RZGLG\RXILUVWKHDUWKHQHZVRIWKH
&KDOOHQJHUGLVDVWHU"´OHVV than 24 hr after the event. The questionnaire also contained other 
items pertaining to emotionality, vividness, confidence, and so forth. Some 2.5 years later, 44 
of the original 106-person sample were administered a similar questionnaire, and when the 
extent of inaccuracy was noted, 40 of the participants were invited to a follow-up interview 
some months later. Each participant was interviewed for 45 min, and the interviews were 
recorded and transcribed for analysis²as per many qualitative interview studies. During the 
interview another description of the Challenger event was elicited, and another series of 
rating scales administered verbally. Participants were presented with a number of retrieval 
cues designed to recover the original account. Finally, at the end of the interview, participants 
were shown their original accounts in their own handwriting, a revelation that prompted great 
surprise for participants and the interviewer (who had not seen the original reports before). 
Discrepancies between current and original accounts were then discussed with each 
participant, and each was asked which version they preferred and believed most.  
Clearly, this study prioritized the subjective recollections of participants, generating 
three different accounts of the same phenomenon, two written and one verbal. Moreover, the 
interview method gave participants scope to reflect on differences between accounts, with 
individual preferences and judgments also encouraged. Apart from the deployment of 
retrieval cues and ratings, this interview format has much in common with typical 
semistructured interviews used in much qualitative research in psychology. The book chapter 
in which the findings are reported also reproduces extracts from the written and verbal 
accounts (e.g., two accounts from the same participant) alongside accuracy scores, with the 
qualitative and quantitative data supporting the same conclusions. Other findings relating to 
emotion, vividness, and confidence ratings and their relation to accuracy are also presented. 
The most striking finding, as the authors noted, is that participants continued to insist on the 
veracity of their contemporary (event-distant) accounts over the original (event-near) 
versions²despite being cued to retrieve the original accounts and despite actually being 
shown these initial accounts. This finding arises from the interview format and is vividly 
FRQYH\HGE\VHOHFWHGTXRWHV³,PHDQOLNH, told you, I have no recollection oILWDWDOO´³,
still think of it as the RWKHUZD\DURXQG´1HLVVHU	+DUVFKS$VWKHDXWKRUV 
FRQFOXGHG³$VIDUDVZHFDQWHOOWKHRULJLQDOPHPRULHVDUHMXVW JRQH´1HLVVHU	+DUVFK
1992, p. 21).  
This example demonstrates that quantitative research can be enhanced by placing 
greater value on participant subjectivity and maximizing opportunities for its expression 
within the format of the study. And while we applaud the Neisser and Harsch (1992) study, 
qualitative psychologists would propose further subjective elaborations. For example, 
researchers themselves may have provided accounts of the Challenger disaster and then 
reflexively discussed the discrepancies between their own accounts. As well, interviews 
could have been used at all stages of the research and participants invited to talk about the 
personal meaning of the inn, quality of life). It is possible, for example, that some participants 
adopted an anti-National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) stance and that this 
would have impacted their accounts; indeed, research on the fading affect bias suggest that a 
public event construed as negative fades faster in memory compared with a positive construal 
VHH%RKQDQG%HUQWVHQ¶VDUWLFOHUHODWLQJWR the fall of the Berlin Wall).  
More generally, quantitative content analysis of qualitative data, whereby the data are 
segmented and allocated to a predetermined coding scheme, could be supplemented by 
inductive, bottom-up qualitative analysis of the data set whereupon categories not anticipated 
by the research hypotheses may emerge and could inform further hypothesis generation and 
testing.  
In some qualitative research projects, participant subjectivity and involvement is 
progressed when investigators seek participant feedback on research documents such as 
interview transcripts and draft analyses (sometimes termed participant validation; see Lincoln 
& Guba, 1985). This may take the form of a second interview that is recorded, transcribed, 
and, itself, analyzed. Participants may be invited to record diary entries about their 
experiences of the phenomenon under investigation, which may include reflections on the 
experience of being a research participant. For example, returning to autobiographical 
memory research, participants may be asked to reflect on the experience of participating in 
the study in terms of writing the diaries and the later tasks around recognition and recall, an 
exercise that could well recommend refinements and improvements in study content and 
design.  
Some phenomenological research has gone further in presenting interviewees with 
extracts from earlier interviews and inviting their reflections on what they said (J. Smith, 
2003)²which in some respects recalls the Neisser and Harsch (1992) interview regarding 
Challenger shuttle flashbulb memories where participants were presented with their earlier 
accounts for comparison with their latest versions. Indeed, some forms of qualitative research 
explicitly recruit participants as co-researchers from the start of a project. Such participatory 
action research projects (Fine & Sirin, 2007) clearly challenge the boundaries between 
researcher and researched and disrupt the classic position of the psychologist researcher as 
expert (McFadden & McCamley, 2003).  
Participatory action research involves deliberately challenging pure scientific 
principles in order to develop a lay or community centered approach to knowledge 
production and dissemination (Brydon-Miller, 2004). Within this type of collaborative 
project, both researcher(s) and community members share common goals, usually in the form 
of generating new knowledge in order to facilitate social change for a particular marginalized 
group. The scientist is passionately engaged rather than dispassionate and detached, and 
research design is informed as much by team concerns and objectives as scientific know-how. 
The development of questionnaires, interview schedules, interventions, and so forth is a joint 
enterprise, and community members are at the forefront of data collection, analysis, and 
dissemination² both within the locale and to the wider scientific constituency.  
A nice example here is described by Merrifield (1993). Residents from Yellow Creek, 
Kentucky, who were concerned about the health effects of toxins that had entered the water 
supply, formed an action group that enlisted the support of researchers from Vanderbilt 
University in order to develop a survey. The survey was then distributed to almost 300 
households, a [p.378] resulting analysis identified raised levels of kidney and gastrointestinal 
problems. This initial survey thus provided evidence to substantiate community concerns, 
which then led to further qualitative data collection and analysis and empowered group 
members to seek intervention from the authorities. Some tension was reported between 
community activists and academic researchers, underlining the importance of clear and 
careful negotiation regarding ownership of the project.  
The popularity of this type of research is increasing in some quarters. For example, 
expert patients and lay people are increasingly being asked to inform the design and progress 
of health related research (see Donaldson, 2003). A project on coping with diabetes, for 
example, might enlist the contribution of patients in terms of aims, recruitment methods, and 
practical applications. For further examples, there are now several journals that publish such 
research, including the American Journal of Community Psychology and the Journal of 
Community & Applied Social Psychology.  
While any undermining of the UHVHDUFKHU¶VDXWKRULW\FRXOG prove threatening²for 
both researcher and participant²it can be argued that the benefits of a more democratic 
research encounter in the form of richer, contextualized knowledge outweigh any loss of 
status or power. Even if resources will not allow for full-blown participatory action research 
projects, the principle of participant engagement is attractive because even limited 
opportunities for reflection may yield new insights as participants mull over their 
contributions to the research and encourage researchers to revise and refine their 
interpretations. For most research projects, whether qualitative or quantitative, it would cost 
little to make provision for the expression of participant subjectivity within project designs. A 
questionnaire study, for example, need only include a section at the end where respondents 
are invited explicitly to elaborate on responses already indicated and to outline relevant 
factors not included in the survey. Such opportunities may well offer up valuable information 
to researchers, a hitherto unanticipated theme or hypothesis perhaps, or suggestions for 
developing a more participant-friendly study, in both cases providing ideas for further 
research.  
Taking things a little further, one can imagine questionnaires that are entirely 
qualitative, thereby maximizing the potential for participant-centered accounts (see Toerien 
& Wilkinson, 2004). In this way the researcher provides a predesigned tool informed by 
variables deemed relevant to the research question(s), while the participant enjoys freedom to 
respond in ways that are personally interesting and significant. It is likely that participants 
will introduce information unanticipated by the researcher. Rather than fearing this as a loss 
of control or source of bias, it could be regarded as opening up potentially fruitful avenues of 
investigation hitherto unexplored.  
Another strategy for encouraging participant comment is to conduct interviews with a 
subset of participants in which they have the chance to expand on their contributions to the 
research and to comment on what it was like to be a participant in the project. It is possible 
that such a face-to-face encounter with a researcher could prove intimidating for some 
participants, thereby undermining the usefulness of the session. This is not an insurmountable 
barrier, and techniques used in interview research (e.g., Madill, 2012) can facilitate dialogue. 
For example, if interviews are conducted away from the research laboratory in a familiar, 
informal environment and participants are reassured that they are not being tested then useful 
feedback may emerge. Such feedback could be audio recorded for review. If a detailed 
analysis is warranted, a transcription of the interview may be required. Transcription can be 
time consuming, but a small sample and short interviews may yield valuable information 
such as potential confounds in experimental GHVLJQZKHQYLHZHGIURPWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶
perspective.  
Information technologies may facilitate the development of user-friendly 
opportunities for the promotion of participant subjectivity, such as e-mail and text requests 
for reflections on the study and/or elaborations on data already provided. For example, an 
exchange of e-mails between researcher and each willing participant would function as a 
form of interview, albeit asynchronous and at a distance, and may well remove some of the 
conventional asymmetries found in face-to-face research interviews and so enable high 
quality feedback to be elicited. Such an exchange may well take place over days or even 
weeks, but time invested by both parties allows the researcher to follow up on issues raised in 
prior e-mails and the participant to reflect further on their experience (Selwyn & Robson, 
1998). Other technologies may be deployed here to good effect, such as instant messaging 
(IM) programs, where researcher and participant communicate in real time while located in 
different environments (Stieger & Göritz, 2006). The immediacy and convenience of this 
form of conversation is attractive, and the time taken to think about then type responses 
makes for a degree of reflection, although clearly both researcher and target sample would 
need to be familiar with the IM program adopted, and again many groups in society may not 
be aware of or use such technologies or have Internet access.  
In sum, building in an opportunity for research participants to comment further on the 
variables and research questions under investigation, whether packaged as part of the project 
or as a voluntary add-on, has the potential to complement, contextualize, and extend the 
findings from the main study or studies. Indeed, there is an increasing tendency toward mixed 
methods research within psychological science whereby quantitative results are 
complemented by qualitative²although the precise balance between quantitative and 
qualitative, and issues around epistemology and research goals, does vary greatly (see Madill 
& Gough, 2008; Todd, Nerlich, McKeown, & Clark, 2004).  
While not denigrating their usefulness, we note now that the practices outlined above 
designed to potentiate participant subjectivity imply an uncomplicated conception of the 
psychological subject. In other words, it is assumed that a research participant can reach 
inside themselves and extract their experiences, which are then conveyed unproblematically 
using language. This experiential YLHZZKHUHE\SDUWLFLSDQWV³WHOOLWOLNHLWLV´KDVEHHQ 
criticized (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). For example, a social constructionist would argue 
that, rather than revealing experience, accounts are co-constructed, context bound, and 
performative (i.e., action oriented; see Burr, 1995). Paying attention to the setup and 
dynamics of any researcher±participant feedback session is therefore important in order to 
make sense of what is being said in context and allows us to think through issues such as 
transferability across situations. For example, recall of significant life events may well vary 
according to who is inviting the participant to remember (researcher, best friend, teacher), 
where the recall is taking place (lab, home, school), how the recall is elicited (face-to- face 
interview, questionnaire, telephone conversation), and so forth. Imagining or recording 
participant responses in other con [p.379] texts may alert us to the boundedness of the data in 
our research projects.  
More radically, this constructionist stance raises questions about how our research 
methods and researcher hypotheses influence and constrain the nature of the data we collect 
and analyze (see e.g., Hugh-Jones & Madill, 2009). Indeed, there has been much debate over 
the years within social psychology around the validity of classic studies such as the SPE 
(Haney et al., 1973). For example, far from acting naturally it has been established that the 
prison guards were operating under fairly clear instructions from the researcher (see Baron, 
1984) and that the mock prison environment did not match many features associated with an 
actual prison (Banuazizi & Movahedi, 1975). In an imaginative part replication of the SPE, 
Reicher and Haslam (2006) explicitly addressed the influence of the special context created 
for the study, IRUH[DPSOHWKLQNLQJWKURXJKWKHLPSDFWRISDUWLFLSDQWV¶NQRZOHGJH that they 
were being filmed at all times.  
Instead of trying to simplify or simulate real-life situations, there are arguments that 
SV\FKRORJLVWVDQGVRFLDOUHVHDUFKHUVVKRXOG³JR ZKHUHWKHDFWLRQLV´WKDWLVREVHUYHUHFRUG
and analyze phenomena as they occur naturally (e.g., Potter & Hepburn, 2005). While one 
FRXOGGLVSXWHWKHPHDQLQJDQGUHDFKRIWKHWHUP³QDWXUDOLVWLF´ (see Speer, 2002), researchers 
might benefit from considering how WKHLUWRSLFRILQWHUHVWPLJKWEHSOD\HGRXWLQ³UHDOOLIH´
For example, how is national identity invoked in bars, homes, and workplaces as well as in 
group-based psychology experiments or interviews with a researcher? Such thinking pushes 
us as researchers to recognize the limits of our paradigms and may well prompt us to refine 
and extend our methods or incorporate naturalistic elements in our research design.  
Beyond the relevance of social contexts, some psychosocial and narrative researchers 
DUJXHWKDWWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ELRJUDSKLHVEH incorporated into the design of research studies. 
For example, if the research focus is on crime, then participants may be invited to recall and 
recount early experiences as opposed to (or as well as) asking about perceptions of currently 
salient crimes or researcher generated vignettes (see Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). Typically, 
such life-history research would pursue an extended engagement with research participants: a 
second interview, for example, or a follow-up questionnaire. In a second interview, the 
participant may be asked to clarify or to expand on original responses, but this is also an 
opportunity to encourage the participant to free associate, to meander away from the original 
research topic. These accounts FDQEHOLQNHGZLWKWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶VELRJUDSK\EXWDOVRWKH
social context(s) in which they are embedded, including the research context. For example, in 
RQHRI+ROOZD\¶VH[DPSOHV+ROOZD\	 Jefferson, 2000), she speculated that an interaction 
with one participant was informed by a mother± daughter dynamic influenced by that 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶V²and her own²familial experiences (see also below). In other words, it is the 
SDUWLFLSDQW¶VDJHQGDWKDWLV prioritized, whether or not this matches the ostensible research 
topic. Such a stance requires an open-minded researcher who is not wedded to specific topics 
and who does not intervene too much in the research encounter. This stance will not be an 
attractive option for researchers with very specific hypotheses and research goals, but even in 
the most tightly controlled experiment paying attention to ostensibly nonrelevant participant 
input may bear fruit. For example, participant off-the-record comments noticed before, 
during, or after a study may yield insights into motivations for participation (e.g., a personal 
problem associated with the research topic), participant expectations (e.g., apprehension 
about being DVVHVVHGE\DSV\FKRORJLVWDQGHYDOXDWLRQVHJ³WKDWH[SHULPHQW was so 
ERULQJ´²all information that helps contextualize the research and that may well point to 
important psychological variables at work.  
Psychosocial approaches do not regard the research participant as an expert on his or 
her experience. In fact, it is the researcher who is implicitly positioned as the expert, 
scrutinizing and dissecting participant claims and linking these to, say, (unconscious) 
memories, emotions, and defenses (e.g., Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). At the same time, it is 
anticipated here that interactions with research participants may prompt identifications, 
dynamics, and feelings in the researcher that need to be thought through and reflected on 
(discussed below under researcher reflexivity).  
The above discussion has tended to focus on participant subjectivity. Researchers are 
also psychological subjects whose subjectivity might be divided usefully into scientific and 
human versions, with the scientific holding sway in most research encounters: that is, 
professionally self-disciplined and removed from the world of social interaction (Fox-Keller, 
1996). So let us now turn our attention toward understanding how researcher subjectivity has 
been conceptualized and used by qualitative researchers. 
Reflexivity: Working With Researcher Subjectivity 
The conventional focus of psychological research is on the participants and the data they 
provide, which makes perfect sense. The experimenter, the questionnaire author, the 
interviewer, and all the other research psychologist roles, are not generally foregrounded. 
This (semi)detached stance works to preserve the integrity of the research and to produce data 
that are clean, precise, and valid. There are checks and balances to maximize objectivity, such 
as controlling for possible biases through the reliability check of multiple coders in both 
quantitative and post-positivist forms of qualitative research (such as grounded theory; see 
Madill, 2011). 7KHUHVHDUFKHU¶VSart in designing the project, the differential interactions with 
participants, and any bias in data analysis are issues that are not normally dwelled upon. 
Reflexivity, however, is widely understood to entail a commitment to identifying and 
contextualizing WKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VSHUVRQDODJHQGDWKRXJKLQSUDFWLFH this often amounts to a 
VWDWHPHQWDERXWWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶V motivation and experience concerning the topic to be studied 
(Finlay & Gough, 2003). [Footnote 1: Reflexivity was originally formulated to distinguish 
between natural and human sciences: Psychologists are subject to the same psychological 
phenomena as the nonpsychologists who participate in psychological research, while 
physicists as humans are not meaningfully influenced by, say, electromagnetic fields (see 
Bourdieu, 1992; Flanagan, 1981).]  
At a basic level, a researcher studying the topic of first-time fatherhood might allude 
to their own parental status and interests. For example, the researcher may have recently 
become or is in the process of becoming a new father and thus declare a personal as well as 
academic interest in finding out about other PHQ¶VH[SHULHQFHV This position may well lead 
them to divulge their parenthood status and even share experiences in research interviews 
with participants. A researcher who presents as a mother or mother to-be might declare an 
interest in how male partners experience the [p.380] transition to parenthood and might 
consider the role of gender (difference) in her investigation. Whatever position one is coming 
from, the divulging of a personal dimension may work to relax some of the potential barriers 
between researcher and participant and facilitate recruitment and rapport during data 
collection, with ensuing positive impact on the quality of the data. Such a personal approach 
might even be deemed strategic, that is, intentionally deployed to engender the extraction of 
better data. Whatever the chosen research methodology, researchers of all persuasions may 
find it fruitful to present such a personal face at different stages of the research process. 
Clearly, a balance needs to be struck between conducting rigorous research and the judicious 
deployment of researcher subjectivity, and this balance will vary according to RQH¶V
commitment to particular research traditions and practices.  
7KLVFRPPLWPHQWWRDQGGLVSOD\RIWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VSHUVRQDO agenda implies a 
straightforward position on subjectivity. It assumes, for example, that the researcher has 
access to their subjective motivations for doing a particular research project. A 
constructionist view of subjectivity, as discussed above, problematizes the notion that people 
are transparent to themselves and can accurately report their inner thoughts and feelings. 
Within this point of view, such claims and reflexive practices should themselves be subjected 
to analysis as accounts that perform certain functions, such as facilitating reciprocal 
disclosure in research participants.  
7KXVLWPD\EHIUXLWIXOWRFULWLFDOO\DQDO\]HRQH¶VRZQVXEMHFWLYH interventions in the 
UHVHDUFKSURFHVVDVZHOODVWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶ data so that the research findings are properly 
situated. For example, Gough (2003b) drew attention to the salient identities and power 
relations that pertain in a focus group study with men on the topic of masculinities, which 
mostly favor the researcher (e.g., as expert interrogator) but which at times indicate 
participant power and researcher vulnerability, as when participants suddenly depart from the 
script and direct difficult questions to the researcher. He identified the ways in which he 
positioned himself, and was positioned by other speakers, as a man rather than a researcher, 
and proceeded to discuss the consequences of these interactions for the data and the research 
more generally. Similarly, Hollway (Hollway & Jefferson, 2000) identified and reflected on 
her (unconscious) positioning of herself as maternal during an interview with a younger 
ZRPDQRIIHULQJV\PSDWKHWLFUHVSRQVHVWRWKHSDUWLFLSDQW¶V tales of hardship and distress 
while also orienting to the SDUWLFLSDQW¶VFKLOGZKRZDVSUHVHQWGXULQJWKHLQWHUYLHZLQD 
(grand)motherly way. Again, such researcher subjectivity was used, albeit unconsciously, to 
enhance the research encounter and later critically discussed to highlight the context-
boundedness of the data.  
All researchers, whether qualitative or quantitative, can engagein critical thinking 
about such instances where normative research practices are disturbed, or even subverted, as 
further insights about the conduct of research and about the topic of interest may be 
forthcoming. The work of Horace Mann Bond (1927) on race and IQ is pertinent here, and 
Morawski (2005) discussed how his studies illuminated various sources of bias in the design, 
practice, and reporting of psychological research in this area. For example, he showed how 
the race of the researcher directly influenced test results, as well as pointing to tacit 
researcher assumptions about the nature of intelligence (as innate) and about negro (sic) 
FKLOGUHQ¶V LQWHOOLJHQFHDVLQIHULRUWR:KLWHFKLOGUHQ¶V5HWXUQLQJWR the SPE (Haney et al., 
1973), Zimbardo, a participant observer in the study (the superintendent) who, along with 
other team members, maintained informal diaries during the process, admitted that ³WKH
experimenters became more personally involved in the transaction and were not as distant 
and objective as they could have EHHQ´S78). From a qualitative standpoint, the apologetic 
tone is not required here. Researcher involvement, however unplanned or unanticipated, 
presents opportunities for reflexive analysis, and here Zimbardo and colleagues may have 
reflected on their influence RQWKHJXDUGV¶EHKDYLRUIRUH[DPSOH2YHUWLPHWKH\KDYHWR 
some extent, reflected on their role in facilitating the events that unfolded and admitted to 
some guilt in allowing abusive practices by the guards to proceed unchecked until a junior 
team member insisted on halting the study. Zimbardo also came to question the ethics of 
placing people in such challenging and potentially explosive situations in the pursuit of 
knowledge, and much debate on ethical issues ensued (e.g., S. S. Smith & Richardson, 1983).  
Researcher interventions may also invoke personal history as well as the social 
identities taken up and resisted during the research encounter. The psychosocial stance on 
subjectivity explicitly invites researchers to engage with their own biographies where 
relevant. For example, Jefferson (Hollway & Jefferson, IRXQGDQLQWHUYLHZHH¶VDFFRXQW
of his childhood overly SRVLWLYHEDVHGRQWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VUHFROOHFWLRQVRIKLVRZQXSEULQJLQJ 
in similar circumstances. This reflexivity, together with other evidence (e.g., accounts of 
other family members) led him to WKHDQDO\WLFLQVLJKWWKDWWKHLQWHUYLHZHH¶VDFFRXQWVHUYHGD
defensive IXQFWLRQ,QWKLVFDVHWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VRZQUHFROOHFWLRQVRI early experiences are 
used as a resource to inform the interpretation of participant accounts. Of course, as Jefferson 
acknowledged, one need not take such researcher-generated accounts at face value. As stated 
earlier, the reflexive contributions of researchers should themselves be subject to critical 
scrutiny.  
The applicability and transferability of reflexive practices that draw upon the 
UHVHDUFKHU¶VRZQSV\FKRORJLFDOKLVWRU\LVSHUKDSV limited to research projects and 
methodologies in which boundaries between researcher and participant are explicitly porous, 
as in participatory action projects for example, or forms of community research (Fine & Sirin, 
2007). Nonetheless, the principle of interrogating RQH¶VRZQSHUVRQDODQGVRFLDOLGHQWLWLHV
histories, and research practices is sound enough and can be taken on board in many research 
projects, including psychology experiments. For example, the work of Rosenzweig (1933) on 
unconscious dynamics within the experimental situation, as cited in Morawski (2005), draws 
attention to errors of personality influence and suggestion E\YLUWXHRIWKHH[SHULPHQWHU¶V
unacknowledged orientations and unintended practices.  
0RUHEURDGO\UHIOH[LYLW\FDQDOVRLQYROYHVLJQDOLQJRQH¶VORFDWLRQ within 
methodological, disciplinary, and ideological traditions (Wilkinson, 1988). This more 
political dimension of reflexivity is endorsed by feminist and critical researchers interested in 
challenging the findings of conventional social science research (Stainton-Rogers, Stenner, 
Gleeson, & Stainton-Rogers, 1995). For example, work by Gill (1993) on indirect sexism 
challenges the liberal humanist approach that views prejudice as individual pathology rather 
than social practice promoted by dominant institutions and reproduced in everyday talk. 
Similarly, critical psychologists working from an anti-psychiatry stance might seek to critique 
biomedical discourses around mental illness with a view to [p.381] prioritizing patient 
perspectives and practices (I. Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin, & Stowell Smith, 
1995).  
There is evidence of such stances in quantitative work that entails a political 
commitment of one shape or form that, of course, at one level undermines the scientific ideal 
of impartiality (see Stainton-Rogers et al., 1995). For example, much social psychological 
research on prejudice displays a concern, either implicitly or explicitly, with reducing 
prejudice, for example, through investigating the contact hypothesis, where members of 
different groups are brought together under certain conditions in order to improve relations 
between the two groups (see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000). Less ideologically, psychology 
researchers of various methodological traditions recognize that any data can be generated in 
different ways and that any given data set can be analyzed using diverse methods, whether 
employing distinct factor analytic techniques, regression models, or modes of qualitative data 
analysis. Registering RQH¶VDWWDFKPHQWWRDSDUWLFXODUPHWKRGRORJLFDODSSURDFKRU 
epistemological position, while acknowledging alternative or complementary techniques and 
perspectives, is an important step in situating the research project.  
But reflexivity need not be straightforward. The task of accessing, divulging, and 
FULWLFDOO\DQDO\]LQJRQH¶VSHUVRQDOPHWKRGRORJLFDO and/or ideological values as a researcher 
may be convoluted, HYHQSDLQIXO7LPHDQGHIIRUWDUHUHTXLUHGWRUHIOHFWRQRQH¶V possible 
motivations, agendas, and goals as a researcher. Moreover, RQH¶VUHVHDUFKDPELWLRQVPD\
shift and mutate over time and according to context. More profoundly, the notion of 
reflexivity, itself, can be deconstructed to show how it can be used strategically to enhance 
the status of research. For example, the claim to share common experiences and identities 
with participants and thus to generate valuable insider insights may be, although not untrue, 
recognized also as a ploy (see Seale, 1999). In order to disrupt simplistic and self-serving 
uses of reflexivity, some researchers have been moved to explore alternative forms of writing 
(e.g., poetry or dramatic dialogue) to demonstrate multiple interpretations of a phenomenon 
(see e.g., Ashmore, 1989; MacMillan, 2003; Richardson, 1992). These creative forms of 
reflexivity have been, in turn, critiqued as indulgent and narcissistic, straying too far from the 
topic in question and into ³QDYHO-JD]LQJ´WHUULWRU\VHH Alvesson, Hardy, & Harley, 2008; 
Gough, 2003a).  
Ultimately, the manner in which reflexivity is defined and practiced will depend on 
theoretical and, possibly, ideological predilection, but the common goal of reflexive analysis 
is to help FRQWH[WXDOL]HDQGLOOXPLQDWHWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH phenomenon 
under investigation (see Alvesson et al., 2008). At the same time, researchers might, in a 
further turn, reflexively analyze the strategic functions of their declared allegiances. It is, 
ideally, a [p.382] reflexive engagement and can be regarded as an indicator of research 
quality (Finlay & Gough, 2003). 
Conclusion 
We have concentrated on subjectivity because it is a concept that preoccupies both qualitative 
and quantitative researchers in psychology alike. We have suggested that subjectivity should 
not always be eschewed in (quantitative) psychological science. Rather, as psychological 
researchers (both quantitative and qualitative) have sometimes demonstrated, subjectivity 
within the research process may be seen as a valuable resource that can be tapped to 
illuminate both the phenomenon under investigation and to situate research design and 
practices more generally.  
,QPRYLQJIURP³SUREOHPWRSURVSHFW´ZHVXJJHVWWKDWSV\Fhologists consider the 
following questions during the process of designing, conducting, and analyzing research, and 
we provide guidance in Table 1 on how techniques and methods discussed in this article 
might be used to facilitate meaningful engagement with subjectivity. Resource constraints 
and pressures to complete and publish psychological research will mean that active 
engagement with subjectivity will be difficult if not impossible on many projects. However, 
many strategies highlighted in Table 1 do not require huge investment and could yield real 
benefits (e.g., attending to informal comments from participants, discussing subjectivity at 
research team meetings, using participant extracts in research reports). And incorporating 
subjectivity into research procedures and reports need not undermine the quest for 
generalizable findings. A reflexive scientific attitude where both researchers and participants 
take subjectivity seriously does not preclude the pursuit of the general; rather, in attending to 
context-bound (inter) subjective processes and reports, our claims about generalities can be 
more informed, refined, and persuasive. To conclude, we have hopefully indicated that a 
questioning of the discourse and practice RIHOLPLQDWLQJ³ELDV´PD\ZHOORSHQXp 
opportunities for doing research that is informed by, while also informing, human subjectivity 
and progress toward a more reflexive psychological science. 1 Reflexivity was originally 
formulated to distinguish between natural and human sciences: Psychologists are subject to 
the same psychological phenomena as the nonpsychologists who participate in psychological 
research, while physicists as humans are not meaningfully influenced by, say, 
electromagnetic fields (see Bourdieu, 1992; Flanagan, 1981). 
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Table 1 [p.381] 
Tasks and Strategies Concerning Subjectivity in Psychological Research 
Task Possible strategies 
How may research 
participants be 
facilitated to elaborate 
on their responses? 
Provide space for open-ended responses on questionnaires; build in 
opportunities for verbal contributions before, during, and after the 
study; consider post- or follow-up interviews with participants. 
How should 
³DGGLWLRQDO´SDUWLFLSDQW
responses be 
incorporated into the 
research? 
An initial, data-led inductive analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967); a second analytic stage linking derived 
themes to prevailing theory, perhaps leading to conceptual 
refinements. 
How should apparently 
³LUUHOHYDQW´SDUWLFLSDQW
data be managed? 
'RQRWLJQRUH³RIIWRSLF´DFFRXQWV²consider their relevance to 
literature outside of current research focus and the possibility of 
new research questions and investigations. 
How should participant 
accounts be 
incorporated into 
research reports? 
Present verbatim participant extracts accompanied by researcher 
analysis specifically orienting to the fit with other data and relevant 
theory; make transparent the methods of eliciting and analyzing the 
accounts. 
What is it like to be a 
research participant? 
Imagine yourself as a research participant and complete some or all 
of the tasks asked of the participants, recording your thoughts and 
feelings in the process; contrast your experience as a participant (of 
sorts) with that of researcher, and use these reflections to inform 
research design and content. 
In what ways can 
researcher subjectivity 
be monitored? 
Become familiar with the concept and practice of reflexivity (e.g., 
Finlay, 2002); write a research journal documenting reflections on, 
reactions to, and adjustments made during the research (e.g., topic 
choice, theoretical preference, interpersonal dynamics). 
How can a reflexive Awareness of subjective preferences and their impact on research 
attitude improve 
research practice? 
can be mobilized to enhance rapport building with participants, 
monitor and control researcher interventions and omissions, and 
enrich data analyses (see Hollway & Jefferson, 2000). 
How would the study 
change if owned and 
designed by the 
relevant population? 
Consider adopting elements of participatory action research (e.g., 
Fine & Sirin, 2007) where participants are involved in conceiving, 
designing, and developing the study, and think through the benefits 
and challenges of doing so. 
How does the research 
fit with psychological 
science? 
Reflect on implicit theories that influence research practices (e.g., 
methodological orientation, preference for pure vs. applied 
research, attitude to other disciplines/collaboration with 
nonpsychologists, etc.). 
 
